Criticism as respect

The Open Society – and by this I mean both the society and the book – is opposed not just to this or that authority, and not just to Plato, Hegel, and Marx. It is opposed to the very idea that there can be anything like cognitive authorities whom we can rely upon or the truth.

So if we are going to understand open society as scientific or rational society, then we must also understand science and rationality in Popper’s terms. We must think of science not as an institutionalized hierarchy of experts, but as a never-ending process of problem-solving in which we propose tentative solutions to our problems and then try to elim­inate the errors in our proposals. We must think of rationality not in terms of justification, but in terms of criticism. And we must think of criticism not as an offense, or as a show of contempt or disdain, but as one of the greatest signs of respetct that one mind can show to another. [47]

The Open Society’s radical consequences

I am a democratic socialist and I believe that the young Popper worked out, as no one else has ever done, what the philosophical foundations of democratic socialism should be. And like him I would like to see these ideas replace the garbled mixture of Marxism and liberal-minded opportunism which passes for politcal theory on the demoracric left: in 1962 I published a book advocating this in the context of British Labour Party politics called The New Radicalism. In short, while making it clear that Popper is no longer a socialist, I want to claim his ideas for the democratic socialism in which he was so deeply enmeshed when he began to produce them, and in response to whose needs they were produced. This is where I believe their real significance is, and where their future lies. My longest-running argument with the older Popper is about what in my contention is his failure to accept, in matters of practical politics, the radical consequences of his own ideas.

The guiding principle for public policy put forward in The Open Society is: ‘Minimize avoidable suffering’. Character­istically, this has the immediate effect of drawing attention to problems. [84]

The idealism of piecemeal engineering

Utopian rationalism is a self-defeating rationalism. However benevolent its ends, it does not bring happiness, but only the familiar misery of being condemned to live under a tyrannical government.

It is important to understand this criticism fully. I do not criticize political ideals as such, nor do I assert that a political ideal can never be realized. This would not be a valid criticism. Many ideals have been realized which were once dogmatically declared to be unrealizable, for example, the establishment of workable and untyrannical institutions for securing civil peace, that is, for the suppression of crime within the state. Again, I see no reason why an international judicature and an international police force should be less successful in suppressing international crime, that is, na­tional aggression and the ill-treatment of minorities or perhaps majorities. I do not object to the attempt to realize such ideals.

Wherein, then, lies the difference between those benevolent Utopian plans to which I object because they lead to vio­lence, and those other important and far-reaching political reforms which I am inclined to recommend?

If I were to give a simple formula or recipe for distinguishing between what I consider to be admissible plans for social reform and inadmissible Utopian blueprints, I might say:

Work for the elimination of concrete evils rather than for the realization of abstract goods. Do not aim at establishing happiness by political means. Rather aim at the elimination of concrete miseries. Or, in more practical terms: fight for the elimination of poverty by direct means—for example, by making sure that everybody has a minimum income. Or fight against epidemics and disease by erecting hospitals and schools of medicine. Fight illiteracy as you fight criminality. But do all this by direct means. Choose what you consider the most urgent evil of the society in which you live, and try patiently to convince people that we can get rid of it.

But do not try to realize these aims indirectly by designing and working for a distant ideal of a society which is wholly good. However deeply you may feel indebted to its inspiring vision, do not think that you are obliged to work for its reali­zation, or that it is your mission to open the eyes of others to its beauty. Do not allow your dreams of a beautiful world to lure you away from the claims of men who suffer here and now. Our fellow men have a claim to our help; no generation must be sacrificed for the sake of future generations, for the sake of an ideal of happiness that may never be realized. In brief, it is my thesis that human misery is the most urgent problem of a rational public policy and that happiness is not such a problem. The attainment of happiness should be left to our private endeavours.[484-5]

Falsifying bundles of political goods

[Democracy] has the role of enabling us to change our political regime by means of elections, rather than by violence. Tis seems to me of the greatest importance; but it is also miportant that we see how limited it is in its consequences. Some control will be exercised over politicians by such means, assuming that the wish to continue in office. But it is a very blunt weapon, considering the way in which we can exercise preferences only for bundles of political goods. Fur­ther, it is also ripe for manipulation – by politicians who find ways to bribe us with money taken from our own pockets, and by their advertising agents, who, as in the United States, have found was to present political issues on television through the use of images in ways which make rational discussion almost impossible. [121]

Education for a new liberty

Aber es bleibt wahr, daß die Art und Weise, in der entwickelte Gesellschaften die geschaftliche Arbeitsteilung organi­siert haben, eine Reihe von Fragen offen läßt, die eine auf Melioration bedachte Gesellschaft beantworten muß, wenn sie sich ihres Namens würdig erweisen will: Wie ist es möglich, Menschen auf die übrigen Tätigkeiten ihrens Lebens in einer Umgebung vorzubereiten, die absichtlich von diesen Tätigkeiten abgesondert ist? Welche Chancen gibt es für diejenigen, die nach einer Zeit der Berufstätigkeit erneut etwas lernen wollen, neue Dinge oder mehr über die Gegen­stände ihrer ursprünglichen Ausbildung? Welchen vernünftigen Sinn kann es haben, einerseits die Arbeit der Men­schen übermäßig zu determinieren und anderersiets ihre Freizeit bewußt undeterminiert zu lassen? … Welchen Sinn hat es, Menschen, die viele Erfahrungen gesammelt haben, gesund sind und arbeiten wollen, in Pension zu schicken? Diese Fragen sind nicht neu; auch läßt sich auf alle durchaus eine Antwort geben. Aber ich meine, daß wir, wenn wir unser Leben bessern wollen, begreifen müssen, daß Bildung mehr ist als die Vorbereitung auf künftige Pflichten, Arbeit mehr als eine unangenehme Last, derer man sich so schnell wie möglich entledigen muß, und Freizeit mehr als eine residuale Zeit, um den Garten zu pflegen, an den Motorrädern der Freunde zu basteln, Fußball zu spielen, Musik zu hören, aber auch sich zu langweilen, sich zu betrinken, das eigene Leben zu zerstören und das von anderen. Die Re­konstruktion des sozialen Lebens der Menschen muß die Versteinerungen einer verfehlten Arbeitsteilung überwinden. Sie zielt darauf ab, die Einheit des menschlichen Lebens wiederherzustellen, oder vielleicht zum ersten Mal überhaupt herzustellen, so daß soziale Lebenschancen einen kontinuierlichen Prozeß menschlicher Tätigkeit versprechen, der in vielfältigen Dimensionen und Weisen seinen Ausdruck findet. Der erste Schritt auf diesem Wege liegt in der Schleifung der Wälle zwischen Bildung, Arbeit und Freizeit. …

Die zentrale Aufgabe der Bildung liegt indes nicht darin, Ersatzteile für den Wirtschaftsprozeß zu produzieren, sondern menschliche Fähigkeiten zu entfalten, indem sie für vielfältige Wahlmöglichkeiten geöffnet und nicht auf angebliche Anforderungen hin getrimmt werden. Darum sollte die Erziehung junger Menschen weit und nicht eng, allgemein und nicht spezialisiert und vor allem nicht zu lang sein. [93-4]

A source of possible criticism

Rationality, for Popper, is to be identified with openness to criticism; and each individual is to be valued a s a source of possible criticism. Objectivity, rather than being regarded as the attribute of the particular, wise individual is regarded as a social product – a product of critical discussion. [111]

The problem of unintended consequences

Eine praktisch verwertbare sozialtechnologische Analyse muß die Beschaffenheit der Ausgangssituation für politisches Handeln, zum Beispiel für die ins Auge gefaßte Gesetzgebung berücksichtigen. Und sie muß dabei auch der Tatsache Rechnung tragen, daß eine solche Gesetzgebung nur bestimmte – meist sehr eng umschriebene – Bestandteile der in­stitutionellen Konstellation in einer Weise ändern kann, die voraussehbare Auswirkungen in der erwünschten Richtung hat. [27]

Politics as a social-technological problem

An die Stelle einer Begründung oder Rechtfertigung im klassischen Sinne tritt hier die komparative Analyse alternativer Vorschläge für die Lösung der betreffenden Probleme auf der Grundlage regulativer Ideen, das heißt: bestimmter Wert­gesichtspunkte, die der Entscheidung – das heißt: der Selektion der im Sinne dieser Ideen besten Lösung – zugrunde­gelegt werden können. Das ordnungspolitische Problem – die Frage nach der Beschaffenheit einer adäquaten Sozial­ordnung – läßt sich unter diesen Voraussetzungen in ein sozialtechnologisches Problem verwandeln, wobei die betref­fen­den Wertgesichtspunkte für diese Formulierung hpothethisch vorausgesetzt werden, wie das ja auch bei der Ana­lyse der Erkenntnispraxis geschehen kann. Es läßt sich nämlich formulieren als Frage anch der Möglichkeit einer sozi­alen Ordnung, die bestimmten Anforderungen genügt, wobei dieser Anforderungen in den Kriterien (Leistungsmerk­malen) zum Ausdruck kommen, an denen sich die vergleichende Untersuchung orientiert. Da es bei solchen Verglei­chen nicht um logische, sondern um reale Möglichkeitne geht, müssen die in Betracht kommenden Gesetzmäßigkeiten berücksichtigt werden. Und da es im konkreten Fall um die jeweils historischen Möglichkeiten geht, das heißt um die Realisierbarkeit in einem bestimmten Raum-Zeit-Gebiet, müssen die in diesem Gebiet vorliegenden tatsächlichen Be­dingungen in die Analyse einbezogen werden.

Es ist selbstverständlich, daß auch die Anforderungen, die an eine adäquate Sozialordnung zu stellen sind, und die ihnen zugrundeliegenden Wertgesichtspunkte keineswegs der Diskussion zu entziehen sind. [24-5]

The invention of enemies

…modern totalitarianism appears to have imperialist tendencies. But this imperialism has no element of a tolerant uni­versalism, and the world-wide ambitions of the modern totalitarians are imposed upon them, as it were, against their will. Two factors are responsible for this. The first is the general tendency of all tyrannies to justify their existence by saving the state (or the people) from its enemies—a tendency which must lead, whenever the old enemies have been successfully subdued, to the creation or invention of new ones. [ch. 10, 199]

Churchill on Brexit

Democracy…does not mean, “We have got our majority, never mind how, and we have our lease of office for five years, so what are you going to do about it?” That is not democracy, that is only small party patter …

The object of the Parliament Act, and the spirit of that Act, were to give effect, not to spasmodic emotions of the electorate, but to the settled, persistent will of the people. What they wanted to do they could do, and what they did not want to do they could stop. All this idea of a handful of men getting hold of the State machine, having the right to make the people do what suits their party and personal interests or doctrines, is completely contrary to every conception of surviving Western democracy. “Some reverence for the laws ourselves have made,” “Some patient force to change them when we will.” We accept in the fullest sense of the word the settled and persistent will of the people. All this idea of a group of super men and super-planners, such as we see before us, “playing the angel,” as the French call it, and making the masses of the people do what they think is good for them, without any check or correction, is a violation of democracy. Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time; but there is the broad feeling in our country that the people should rule, continuously rule, and that public opinion, expressed by all constitutional means, should shape, guide, and control the actions of Ministers who are their servants and not their masters.

Older posts «

» Newer posts