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Falsification as conditional disproof

Kuhn asked what falsification is, if not conclusive disproof. The answer is that falsification is a conditional disproof, conditional on the truth of the used test statements (and in some cases also on the truth of some used auxiliary hypotheses). Feyerabend’s example of the alleged falsification of the Copernican system with naked-eye observations shows this conditional character of falsifications quite well.

Does this cause any logical or methodological problems? The logical situation is quite clear and unproblematic. The methodological situation is only problematic for those who assume that there are infallible test statements. But as Kuhn said, Popper stresses that test statements are fallible. [56]

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