Tag: criticism

Science: a growing system of problems

It seems to me that most philosophers of science use the term ‘accepted’ or ‘acceptable’ as a substitute for ‘believed in’ or ‘worthy of being believed in’. There may be a lot of theories in science that are true and therefore worthy of being be­lieved in. But according to my view of the matter, this worthiness is no concern of science. For science does not attempt positively to justify or to establish this worthiness. On the contrary, it is mainly concerned with criticizing it. It regards, or should regard, the overthrow of even its most admirable and beautiful theories as a triumph, an advance. For we cannot overthrow a good theory without learning an immense amount from it and from its failure. As always, we learn from our mistakes.

The overthrow of a theory always creates new problems. But even if a new theory is not yet overthrown, it will, as we have seen from the example of Bohr’s theory, create new problems. And the quality, the fertility, and the depth of the new problems which a theory creates are the best measures of its intrinsic scientific interest.

To sum up, the question of the acceptance of theories should, I propose, be demoted to the status of a minor problem. For science may be regarded as a growing system of problems, rather than as a system of beliefs. And for a system of problems, the tentative acceptance of a theory or a conjecture means hardly more than that it is considered worthy of further criticism. [103]

The question of the authoritative sources of knowledge

Yet the traditional question of the authoritative sources of knowledge is repeated even today — and very often by posi­tivists, and by other philosophers who believe themselves to be in revolt against authority.

The proper answer to my question ‘How can we hope to detect and eliminate error?’ is, I believe, ‘By criticizing the theories or guesses of others and — if we can train ourselves to do so — by criticizing our own theories or guesses.’ (The latter point is highly desirable, but not indispensable; for if we fail to criticize our own theories, there may be others to do it for us.) This answer sums up a position which I propose to call ‘critical rationalism’. It is a view, an attitude, and a tradition, which we owe to the Greeks. It is very different from the ‘rationalism’ or ‘intellectualism’ of Descartes and his school, and very different even from the epistemology of Kant. Yet in the field of ethics, of moral knowledge, it was approached by Kant with his principle of autonomy. This principle expresses his realization that we must not accept the command of an authority, however exalted, as the basis of ethics. For whenever we are faced with a command by an authority, it is for us to judge, critically, whether it is moral or immoral to obey. The authority may have power to enforce its commands, and we may be powerless to resist. But if we have the physical power of choice, then the ultimate respon­sibility remains with us. It is our own critical decision whether to obey a command; whether to submit to an authority.

Kant boldly carried this idea into the field of religion: ‘…in whatever way’, he writes, ‘the Deity should be made known to you, and even … if He should reveal Himself to you: it is you … who must judge whether you are permitted to believe in Him, and to worship Him.’

In view of this bold statement, it seems strange that Kant did not adopt the same attitude — that of critical examination, of the critical search for error — in the field of science. I feel certain that it was only his acceptance of the authority of Newton’s cosmology — a result of its almost unbelievable success in passing the most severe tests — which prevented Kant from doing so. If this interpretation of Kant is correct, then the critical rationalism (and also the critical empiricism) which I advocate merely puts the finishing touch to Kant’s own critical philosophy. And this was made possible by Einstein, who taught us that Newton’s theory may well be mistaken in spite of its overwhelming success.

So my answer to the questions ‘How do you know? What is the source or the basis of your assertion? What obser­vations have led you to it?’ would be: ‘I do not know: my assertion was merely a guess. Never mind the source, or the sources, from which it may spring — there are many possible sources, and I may not be aware of half of them; and origins or pedigrees have in any case little bearing upon truth. But if you are interested in the problem which I tried to solve by my tentative assertion, you may help me by criticizing it as severely as you can; and if you can design some experimental test which you think might refute my assertion, I shall gladly, and to the best of my powers, help you to refute it.’ [34-5]

The most striking fact of evolution

What I regard as the most important point is not the sheer autonomy and anonymity of the third world, or the admittely very important point that was always owe almost everything to our predecessors and to the tradtion which they created: that we thus owe to the third world especially our rationality — that is, our subjective mind, the practice of critical and self-critical ways of thinking and the corresponding dispositions. More important than all this, I suggest, is the relation between ourselves and our work, and what can be gained for us from this relation.

[…] I suggest that everything depends upon the give-and-take between ourselves and our work; upon the product which we contribute to the third world, and upon that constant feed-back that can be amplified by conscious self-criticism. The incredible thing about life, evolution, and mental growth, is just this method of give-and-take, this inter­action between our actions and their results by which we constantly transcend ourselves, our talents, our gifts.

This self-transcendence is the most striking and important fact of all life and all evolution, and especially of human evolution. [147]

The method of the social sciences

Sechste These (Hauptthese):

a) Die Methode der Sozialwissenschaften wie auch die der Naturwissenschaften besteht darin, Lösungsversuche für ihre Probleme – die Probleme, von denen sie ausgeht – auszuprobieren.

Lösungen werden vorgeschlagen und kritisiert. Wenn ein Lösungsversuch der sachlichen Kritik nicht zugänglich ist, so wird er eben deshalb als unwissenschaftlich ausgeschaltet, wenn auch vielleicht nur vorläufig.

b) Wenn er einer sachlichen Kritik zugänglich ist, dann versuchen wir, ihn zu widerlegen; denn alle Kritkk besteht in Widerlegungsversuchen.

c) Wenn ein Lösungsversuch durch unsere Kritik widerlegt wird, so versuchen wir es mit einem anderen.

d) Wenn er der Kritik standhält, dann akzeptieren wir ihn vorläufig; und zwar akzeptieren wir ihn vor allem als würdig, weiter diskutiert und kritisiert zu werden.

e) Die Methode der Wissenschaft ist also die des tentativen Lösungsversuches (oder Einfalls), der von der schärfsten Kritik kontrolliert wird. Es ist eine kritische Fortbildung der Methode des Versuchs und Irrtums („trial and error“).

f) Die sogenannte Objektivität der Wissenschaft besteht in der Objektivität der kritische Methode; das heißt aber vor allem darin, daß keine Theorie von der Kritik befreit ist, und auch darin, daß die logischen Hilfmittel der Kritik – die Kategorie des logischen Widerspruchs – objektiv sind. [82]

Owing our reason to other people

When I speak of reason or rationalism, all I mean is the conviction that we can learn through criticism of our mistakes and errors, especially through criticism by others, and eventually also through self-criticism. A rationalist is simply someone for whom it is more important to learn than to be proved right; someone who is willing to learn from others – not by simply taking over another’s opinions, but by gladly allowing others to criticize his ideas and by gladly criticizing the ideas of others. The emphasis here is on the idea of criticism or, to be more precise, critical discussion. The genuine rationalist does not think that he or anyone else is in possession of the truth; nor does he think that mere criticism as such helps us achieve new ideas. But he does think that, in the sphere of ideas, only critical discussion can help us sort the wheat from the chaff. He is well aware that acceptance or rejection of an idea is never a purely rational matter; but he thinks that only critical discussion can give us the maturity to see an idea from more and more sides and to make a correct judgement of it.

This assessment of critical discussion also has its human side. For the rationalist knows perfectly well that critical dis­cussion is not the only relationship between people: that, on the contrary, rational critical discussion is a rare phe­nomenon in our lives. Yet he thinks that the ‘give and take’ attitude fundamental to critical discussion is of the greatest purely human significance. For the rationalist knows that he owes his reason to other people. He knows that the rational critical attitude can only be the result of others’ criticism, and that only through others’ criticism can one arrive at self-criticism. [84]

The longing of uncounted men

I see now more clearly than ever before that even our greatest troubles spring from something that is as admirable and sound as it is dangerous — from our impatience to better the lot of our fellows. For these troubles are the by-products of what is perhaps the greatest of all moral and spiritual revolutions of history, a movement which began three centuries ago. It is the longing of uncounted unknown men to free themselves and their minds from the tutelage of authority and prejudice. It is their attempt to build up an open society which rejects the absolute authority to preserve, to develop, and to establish traditions, old or new, that measure up to their standards of freedom, of humaneness, and of rational criti­cism. It is their unwillingness to sit back and leave the entire responsibility for ruling the world to human or superhuman authority, and their readiness to share the burden of responsibility for avoidable suffering, and to work for its avoidance. This revolution has created powers of appalling destructiveness; but they may yet be conquered. [Preface to 2nd ed.]

Do as I say…

He [Popper] is determined, he has said many times before and since, not to respond to criticisms from any of his former students. … [H]e had a demand for me, or so it seems to me to my regret, namely, that I desist from publicly criticizing him … . [5]

Different ways of knowing

In diesem Zusammenhang wird oft ein fundamentaler Unterschied zwischen Glauben und Wissen behauptet, von dem her solche methodischen Unterschiede legitimiert werden können. Im Bereich des Wissens, vor allem in dem der Wissenschaft, scheint die Vernunft, das rationale Denken, eine ganz andere Funktion zu haben als im Bereich des sogenannten Glaubens. Während im ersten Bereich eine kritische Vernunft am Platze ist, neigt man im zweiten eher dazu, sich für eine deutende, verstehende, hermeneutische Vernunft auszusprechen oder gar die hier adäquate Ver­fahrensweise von der der Vernunft überhaupt abzusetzen. Man entwickelt eine Zwei-Sphären-Theorie, die gewisse tradierte Anschauungen gegen bestimmte Arten der Kritik abschirmen und einen inselhaften Bereich unantastbarer Wahrheiten schaffen soll. In diesem Bereich ist man unter Umständen sogar bereit, die Logik außer Gefecht zu setzen, damit echte Widersprüche akzeptabel werden, allerdings meist ohne die Trag­weite eines solchen Unternehmens und seine Absurdität voll zu erkennen. Man ist zwar im sicheren Besitz der Wahrheit, hat aber dennoch eine gewisse Angst vor kritischer Prüfung und opfert daher oft lieber die elemen­tare Moral des Denkens als diesen angeblich sicheren Besitz. Auf diese Weise kann man dogmatischen Verfahrensweisen mitunter eine gewisse Anerkennung verschaffen, nicht ohne daß die Isolierung verschiedener Bereiche des Denkens und Handelns voneinander jene milde intellek­tuelle Schizophrenie fördert, die es gestattet, die konse­quente Anwendung kritischer Verfahrenweisen als Naivität zu belächeln.

Confirmation bias as a defensive strategy

Die Anwendung dogmatischer Methoden scheint unter Umständen in sehr starken Motiven zu wurzeln. Diese Motive sorgen dafür, daß das System theoretischer Überzeugungen, mit Hilfe dessen sich die betreffenden Personen in der Welt orientieren, in starkem Maße den Charakter eines „Verteidigungs­netzwerkes“ gegen bedroh­liche Informationen gewinnt, so daß die Abschirmungsfunktion, die Funktion der Sicherung, über die Orien­tie­rungsfunktion dominiert. Das System wirkt also selektiv nicht in der Richtung systemrelevanter, sondern in der Richtung systemkonformer Informa­tionen. Man tendiert in weit stärkerem Maße dazu, bestätigende Infor­ma­tio­nen zu sammeln als auf widersprechende Informationen zu achten, weil man auf diese Weise unerwünschte kog­nitive Dissonanz vermeiden kann. Das heißt also, daß man die Methode der positiven Rechtfertigung prak­tiziert, nicht die Methode der kritischen Prüfung, die ja gerade auf relevante Informationen zielt, die mit bis­herigen Anschauungen unvereinbar sind.

Privileged opinions

Die Idee der kritischen Prüfung ist eine methodische Idee, die darauf zurückgeht, daß unser Denken und Handeln der Irrtumsmöglichkeit unterworfen ist, so daß derjenige, der ein echtes Interesse an der Wahrheit hat, daran interessiert sein muß, die Schwächen und Schwierigkeiten seiner Denkresultate und Problemlösungen kennenzulernen, Gegen­argumente zu hören und seine Ideen mit Alternativen konfrontiert zu sehen, um sie vergleichen, modifizieren und revidieren zu können. Nur Anschauungen, die kritischen Argumenten ausgesetzt werden, können sich bewähren. Nur auf dem Hintergrund alternativer Auffassungen lassen sich die Vorzüge und Nachteile bestimmter Konzeptionen beurteilen. Es lohnt sich daher immer, ernsthaft zur Diskussion stehende Ideen in eine Form zu bringen, die solche Vergleiche ermöglicht und ihre Prüfung erleichtert und sie dann tat­sächlich mit Alternativen und Argumenten zu kon­frontieren. Nur in diesem Fall haben sie Gelegenheit zu zeigen, was sie für die Weltorientierung leisten.