Unsere Kritik an der klassischen Methodologie der zureichenden Begründung läßt sich nun prinzipiell auch auf das ethische Grundlagenproblem anwenden, dann sie zielt ja auf die allgemeine Struktur des Begründungsdenkens ohne Rücksicht darauf, welche Art von Überzeugungen zur Diskussion steht. [86]
Tag: critical rationalism
No Archimedean point in ethics either
Wir hatten gesehen, daß das Begründungspostulat für den Bereich der Moralphilosophie zu ebendenselben Schwierigkeiten führt wie für den der Erkenntnisthorie und der Wissenschaftslehre. Die Suche nach dem archimedischen Punkt ist in der Ethik ebenso nutzlos und daher fehlgeleitet wie in anderen Disziplinen. [81]
Growing by mutual criticism
Reason, like science, grows by way of mutual criticism; the only possible way of ‘planning’ its growth is to develop those institutions that safeguard the freedom of this criticism, that is to say, the freedom of thought. [499]
Science: learning from our mistakes
The tension between our knowledge and our ignorance is decisive for the growth of knowledge. It inspires the advance of knowledge, and it determines its ever-moving frontiers.
The word ‘problem’ is only another name for this tension or rather, a name denoting various concrete instances of it.
As I suggested above, a problem arises, grows, and becomes significant through our failures to solve it. Or to put it another way, the only way of getting to know a problem is to learn from our mistakes.
This applies to pre-scientific knowledge and to scientific knowledge.
My view of the method of science is, very simply, that it systematizes the pre-scientific method of learning from our mistakes. It does so by the device called critical discussion.
My whole view of scientific method may be summed up by saying that it consists of these three steps:
1. We stumble over some problem.
2. We try to solve it, for example by proposing some theory.
3. We learn from our mistakes, especially from those brought home to us by the critical discussion of our tentative solutions – a discussion which tends to lead to new problems.
Or in three words: problems – theories – criticism.
I believe that in these three words the whole procedure of rational science may be summed up. [100-1]
Two concepts of induction
In the past, the term ‘induction’ has been used mainly in two senses. The first is repetitive induction (or induction by enumeration). This consists of often repeated observations and experiments, which are supposed to serve as premises in an argument establishing some generalization or theory. The invalidity of this kind of argument is obvious: no amount of observation of white swans establishes that all swans are white (or that the probability of finding a non-white swan is small). In the same way, no amount of observed spectra of hydrogen atoms on earth establishes that all hydrogen atoms emit spectra of the same kind. Theoretical considerations, however, may suggest the latter generalization, and further theoretical considerations may suggest that we should modify it by introducing Doppler shifts and Einsteinian gravitational redshifts.
Thus repetitive induction is out: it cannot establish anything.
The second main sense in which the term ‘induction’ has been used in the past is eliminative induction – induction by the method of eliminating or refuting false theories. This may look at first sight very much like the method of critical discussion that I am advocating. But in fact it is very different. For Bacon and Mill and other exponents of this method of eliminative induction believed that by eliminating all false theories we can finally establish the true theory. In other words, they were unaware of the fact that the number of competing theories is always infinite – even though there are as a rule at any particular moment only a finite number of theories before us for consideration. [104-5]
The mental process of critical rationalism
It is the fashion of the present time to disparage negative logic—that which points out weaknesses in theory or errors in practice, without establishing positive truths. Such negative criticism would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result; but as a means to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the name, it cannot be valued too highly; and until people are again systematically trained to it, there will be few great thinkers, and a low general average of intellect, in any but the mathematical and physical departments of speculation. On any other subject no one’s opinions deserve the name of knowledge, except so far as he has either had forced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the same mental process which would have been required of him in carrying on an active controversy with opponents. That, therefore, which when absent, it is so indispensable, but so difficult, to create, how worse than absurd is it to forego, when spontaneously offering itself! If there are any persons who contest a received opinion, or who will do so if law or opinion will let them, let us thank them for it, open our minds to listen to them, and rejoice that there is some one to do for us what we otherwise ought, if we have any regard for either the certainty or the vitality of our convictions, to do with much greater labour for ourselves. [ch. II, 57-8]
As important a service as a human being can render
To discover to the world something which deeply concerns it, and of which it was previously ignorant; to prove to it that it had been mistaken on some vital point of temporal or spiritual interest, is as important a service as a human being can render to his fellow-creatures […]. [ch. II, 36]
The sole way of attaining a better truth
The beliefs which we have most warrant for, have no safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded. If the challenge is not accepted, or is accepted and the attempt fails, we are far enough from certainty still; but we have done the best that the existing state of human reason admits of; we have neglected nothing that could give the truth a chance of reaching us: if the lists are kept open, we may hope that if there be a better truth, it will be found when the human mind is capable of receiving it; and in the meantime we may rely on having attained such approach to truth, as is possible in our own day. This is the amount of certainty attainable by a fallible being, and this the sole way of attaining it. [ch. II, 28]
The question of the authoritative sources of knowledge
Yet the traditional question of the authoritative sources of knowledge is repeated even today — and very often by positivists, and by other philosophers who believe themselves to be in revolt against authority.
The proper answer to my question ‘How can we hope to detect and eliminate error?’ is, I believe, ‘By criticizing the theories or guesses of others and — if we can train ourselves to do so — by criticizing our own theories or guesses.’ (The latter point is highly desirable, but not indispensable; for if we fail to criticize our own theories, there may be others to do it for us.) This answer sums up a position which I propose to call ‘critical rationalism’. It is a view, an attitude, and a tradition, which we owe to the Greeks. It is very different from the ‘rationalism’ or ‘intellectualism’ of Descartes and his school, and very different even from the epistemology of Kant. Yet in the field of ethics, of moral knowledge, it was approached by Kant with his principle of autonomy. This principle expresses his realization that we must not accept the command of an authority, however exalted, as the basis of ethics. For whenever we are faced with a command by an authority, it is for us to judge, critically, whether it is moral or immoral to obey. The authority may have power to enforce its commands, and we may be powerless to resist. But if we have the physical power of choice, then the ultimate responsibility remains with us. It is our own critical decision whether to obey a command; whether to submit to an authority.
Kant boldly carried this idea into the field of religion: ‘…in whatever way’, he writes, ‘the Deity should be made known to you, and even … if He should reveal Himself to you: it is you … who must judge whether you are permitted to believe in Him, and to worship Him.’
In view of this bold statement, it seems strange that Kant did not adopt the same attitude — that of critical examination, of the critical search for error — in the field of science. I feel certain that it was only his acceptance of the authority of Newton’s cosmology — a result of its almost unbelievable success in passing the most severe tests — which prevented Kant from doing so. If this interpretation of Kant is correct, then the critical rationalism (and also the critical empiricism) which I advocate merely puts the finishing touch to Kant’s own critical philosophy. And this was made possible by Einstein, who taught us that Newton’s theory may well be mistaken in spite of its overwhelming success.
So my answer to the questions ‘How do you know? What is the source or the basis of your assertion? What observations have led you to it?’ would be: ‘I do not know: my assertion was merely a guess. Never mind the source, or the sources, from which it may spring — there are many possible sources, and I may not be aware of half of them; and origins or pedigrees have in any case little bearing upon truth. But if you are interested in the problem which I tried to solve by my tentative assertion, you may help me by criticizing it as severely as you can; and if you can design some experimental test which you think might refute my assertion, I shall gladly, and to the best of my powers, help you to refute it.’ [34-5]
Critical rationality in public life
[Albert:] Falls ich wirklich etwas für Dich bzw. für die Sache des Kritischen Rationalismus im deutschen Sprachraum getan habe, habe ich es ja immer gleichzeitig für meine Sache getan, denn ich identifiziere mich damit und habe auch schon große Freude daran gehabt, daß ich immer wieder Gelegenheit habe, etwas dazu beizutragen. Es ist also gewissermaßen ein wohlverstandener Egoismus erheblich daran beteiligt. Ich könnte mir nichts Schöneres vorstellen, als wenn diese Art von Philosophie gerade im deutschen Sprachraum, wo die Aufklärung immer wieder verketzert wurde, sich bis zu einem gewissen Grade durchsetzen würde und wenn von ihr dann auch günstige Wirkungen auf das kulturelle und politische Leben ausgehen würden. [111]
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