Apart from the peculiar tenets of individual thinkers, there is also in the world at large an increasing inclination to stretch unduly the powers of society over the individual, both by the force of opinion and even by that of legislation: and as the tendency of all the changes taking place in the world is to strengthen society, and diminish the power of the individual, this encroachment is not one of the evils which tend spontaneously to disappear, but, on the contrary, to grow more and more formidable. The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or as fellow citizens to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others, is so energetically supported by some of the best and by some of the worst feelings incident to human nature, that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by anything but want of power; and as the power is not declining, but growing, unless a strong barrier of moral conviction can be raised against the mischief, we must expect, in the present circumstances of the world, to see it increase. [19]
Tag: freedom
The only dignified form of human coexistence
The struggle for freedom may also fail in other ways. It may degenerate into terrorism, as in the French and Russian Revolutions. It may lead to extreme bondage. Democracy and freedom do not guarantee the millennium. No, we do not choose political freedom because it promises us this or that. We choose it because it makes possible the only dignified form of human coexistence, the only form in which we can be fully responsible for ourselves. Whether we realize its possibilities depends on all kinds of things — and above all on ourselves. [92]
How the terrorists win
Not only do I hate violence, but I firmly believe that the fight against it is not hopeless. I realize that the task is difficult. I realize that, only too often in the course of history, it has happened that what appeared at first to be a great success in the fight against violence was followed by a defeat. I do not overlook the fact that the new age of violence which was opened by the two World wars is by no means at an end. Nazism and Fascism are thoroughly beaten, but I must admit that their defeat does not mean that barbarism and brutality have been defeated. On the contrary, it is no use closing our eyes to the fact that these hateful ideas achieved something like a victory in defeat. I have to admit that Hitler succeeded in degrading the moral standards of our Western world, and that in the world of today there is more violence and brutal force than would have been tolerated even in the decade after the first World war. And we must face the possibility that our civilization may ultimately be destroyed by those new weapons which Hitlerism wished upon us, perhaps even within the first decade after the second World war; for no doubt the spirit of Hitlerism won its greatest victory over us when, after its defeat, we used the weapons which the threat of Nazism had induced us to develop. [477-8]
Why freedom is more important than security
… I wish to make it clear that I feel much sympathy with Marx’s hope for a decrease in state influence. It is undoubtedly the greatest danger of interventionism — especially of any direct intervention — that it leads to an increase in state power and in bureaucracy. Most interventionists do not mind this, or they close their eyes to it, which increases the danger. But I believe that once the danger is faced squarely, it should be possible to master it. For this is again merely a problem of social technology and of social piecemeal engineering. But it is important to tackle it early, for it constitutes a danger to democracy. We must plan for freedom, and not only for security, if for no other reason than that only freedom can make security more secure. [ch. 21, 459]
The longing of uncounted men
I see now more clearly than ever before that even our greatest troubles spring from something that is as admirable and sound as it is dangerous — from our impatience to better the lot of our fellows. For these troubles are the by-products of what is perhaps the greatest of all moral and spiritual revolutions of history, a movement which began three centuries ago. It is the longing of uncounted unknown men to free themselves and their minds from the tutelage of authority and prejudice. It is their attempt to build up an open society which rejects the absolute authority to preserve, to develop, and to establish traditions, old or new, that measure up to their standards of freedom, of humaneness, and of rational criticism. It is their unwillingness to sit back and leave the entire responsibility for ruling the world to human or superhuman authority, and their readiness to share the burden of responsibility for avoidable suffering, and to work for its avoidance. This revolution has created powers of appalling destructiveness; but they may yet be conquered. [Preface to 2nd ed.]
With great science comes great responsibility
Why instead did the West slumber through a thousand years of darkness until Columbus and Copernicus and their contemporaries rediscovered the work done in Alexandria? I cannot give you a simple answer. But I do know this: there is no record, in the entire history of the Library, that any of its illustrious scientists and scholars ever seriously challenged the political, economic and religious assumptions of their society. The permanence of the stars was questioned; the justice of slavery was not. Science and learning in general were the preserve of a privileged few. The vast population of the city had not the vaguest notion of the great discoveries taking place within the Library. New findings were not explained or popularized. The research benefited them little. Discoveries in mechanics and steam technology were applied mainly to the perfection of weapons, the encouragement of superstition, the amusement of kings. The scientists never grasped the potential of machines to free people. The great intellectual achievements of antiquity had few immediate practical applications. Science never captured the imagination of the multitude. There was no counterbalance to stagnation, to pessimism, to the most abject surrenders to mysticism. When, at long last, the mob came to burn the Library down, there was nobody to stop them. [278]
Against solidarity
There can be little doubt that science is a social enterprise. But my own sense is that trying to base it upon solidarity and communalism is a big mistake. Solidarity and communalism undoubtedly have their charms. But they are still, as they have always been, the primary threat to the freedom of thought. And the freedom of thought, in my view, is what science and philosophy are really all about. [187]
Critical rationalism in an open society
Das Konzept der offenen (statt einer geschlossenen) Gesellschaft ist freiheitsorientiert und wird im wesentlichen “negativ” (ausgrenzend) definiert, d.h. als Freiheit von Zwang und Unterdrückung durch andere, weniger “positiv” bestimmt, d.h. nicht inhaltlich vorab definiert. Freiheit kann insofern “nicht durch einen Souverän garantiert werden, sondern nur durch eine Pluralität von Institutionen, Konventionen, Regeln und Gesetzen, die immer von neuem auf ihre Funktion der größtmöglichen individuellen Freiheitssicherung überdacht werden müssen.”* Mit der Idee des politisch-weltanschaulichen Pluralismus und der Idee der friedlichen politischen Konkurrenz sind im kritischen Rationalismus zwei weitere wesentliche Ideen des Konzepts der offenen Gesellschaft eng verbunden, und zwar “die Idee der institutionalisierten öffentlichen Kritik und die Idee der politischen Konfliktregelung durch kritisch-rationale Diskussion. Die Idee der Kritik bzw. des kritisch-rationalen Problemlösungsverhaltens (im Gegensatz zum dogmatischen Rechtfertigungsdenken) bildet nicht nur das Fundament der Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftslehre des Kritischen Rationalismus, sondern ist auch für dessen Vernunftverständnis konstitutiv. Kritisch-rationales Problemlösungsverhalten wird dabei immer in einem doppelten Sinne verstanden: als Bemühen um ehrliche Selbstkritik und Bereitschaft zu öffentlicher Kritik. Wie groß die Bedeutung ist, die dabei dem Moment der Öffentlichkeit eingeräumt wird, zeigt der Umstand, daß für Popper wissenschaftliche Objektivität nicht durch noch so bemühte Selbstkritik, sondern immer erst durch vielseitige öffentliche Kritik und Infragestellung von Hypothesen und Erkenntnisansprüchen zustande kommen kann. Nur in öffentlicher Auseinandersetzung mit kritischen Einwänden und Alternativhypothesen vermag sich eine wissenschaftliche Hypothese zu bewähren und, solange sie nicht widerlegt ist, den Status von wissenschaftlicher Objektivität zu erlangen.”* [3]
* Salamun, Kurt: “Kritischer Rationalismus”. [Karl Ballestrem (ed.): Politische Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts. Oldenbourg: 1990.]
Power’s corrosive powers
Sir Karl Popper’s originality as a philosopher of science is usually attributed to his stress on criticism and falsification as routes to knowledge. His originality as a philosopher of society and politics is usually presented as an extension of those epistemological and methodological ideas into what might be termed a defensive view of political life. It was prudent, he famously argued, to act as if tendencies to despotism and tyranny were endemic; to treat all government, indeed all power, with suspicion; and to create a political system in which the government could be changed by the governed without resort to violence. While providing no guarantee of freedom and openness, this was the best available insurance against their erosion. [5]
Was ist Aufklärung?
Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit. Unmündigkeit ist das Unvermögen, sich seines Verstandes ohne Leitung eines anderen zu bedienen. Selbstverschuldet ist diese Unmündigkeit, wenn die Ursache derselben nicht am Mangel des Verstandes, sondern der Entschließung und des Mutes liegt, sich seiner ohne Leitung eines andern zu bedienen. Sapere aude! Habe Mut, dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen! ist also der Wahlspruch der Aufklärung.
Faulheit und Feigheit sind die Ursachen, warum ein so großer Teil der Menschen, nachdem sie die Natur längst von fremder Leitung freigesprochen (naturaliter maiorennes), dennoch gerne zeitlebens unmündig bleiben; und warum es anderen so leicht wird, sich zu deren Vormündern aufzuwerfen. Es ist so bequem, unmündig zu sein. Habe ich ein Buch, das für mich Verstand hat, einen Seelsorger, der für mich Gewissen hat, einen Arzt, der für mich die Diät beurteilt u.s.w., so brauche ich mich ja nicht selbst zu bemühen. Ich habe nicht nötig zu denken, wenn ich nur bezahlen kann; andere werden das verdrießliche Geschäft schon für mich übernehmen. Daß der bei weitem größte Teil der Menschen (darunter das ganze schöne Geschlecht) den Schritt zur Mündigkeit, außer dem daß er beschwerlich ist, auch für sehr gefährlich halte, dafür sorgen schon jene Vormünder, die die Oberaufsicht über sie gütigst auf sich genommen haben. Nachdem sie ihr Hausvieh zuerst dumm gemacht haben und sorgfältig verhüteten, daß diese ruhigen Geschöpfe ja keinen Schritt außer dem Gängelwagen, darin sie sie einsperrten, wagen durften: so zeigen sie ihnen nachher die Gefahr, die ihnen droht, wenn sie es versuchen, allein zu gehen. Nun ist diese Gefahr zwar eben so groß nicht, denn sie würden durch einigemal Fallen wohl endlich gehen lernen; allein ein Beispiel von der Art macht doch schüchtern und schreckt gemeiniglich von allen ferneren Versuchen ab. [635]
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